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Abstract
We study the welfare and energy poverty implications of energy price change scenarios in
Indonesia. Our analysis extends previous analyses of energy price impacts at the household
level in three ways. First, by employing a household energy demand system (QUAIDS),
we are able to distinguish between first- and second-order welfare effects over the income
distribution. Second, our results point to the ownership of energy-processing durables as
another source of impact heterogeneity. Third, we extend the welfare analysis beyond the
money-metric utility effects and look at energy poverty, which is understood as the absence
of or imperfect access to reliable and clean modern energy services. The analysis indicates
that energy prices may serve as an effective instrument to reduce energy use but also have
important adverse welfare effects. The latter can, however, be mitigated by appropriate
compensation policies.
Keywords: climate policy, distributional effects, energy poverty, energy subsidies, poverty
1. Introduction
Fuel and energy prices are subject to government intervention inmany low- andmiddle-
income countries, where governments often set domestic energy prices below market
levels or impose taxes on transport fuels. Increasing energy accessibility for the poor is
one main motivation for subsidising it, while fuel taxation is a popular measure to inter-
nalise externalities at relatively low levels of distortion. In recent years, climate change
mitigation has emerged as an additional reason to regulate energy prices. Such regu-
lation typically affects substantial shares of governments’ budgets, and the abolition of
fuel subsidies in developing countries has frequently been advocated as a win-win policy
which reduces market distortions and internalises negative climate externalities. Addi-
tionally, a large set of studies finds fuel subsidy cuts to be progressive as they impact
richer households more than poorer households (Sterner, 2011; Arze del Granado et al.,
2012; Clements et al., 2013). Nevertheless, fuel subsidies remain popular and attempts
to cut them usually meet with fierce public resistance. This might be partly attributed to
© Cambridge University Press 2018. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Com-
mons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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poor (ex ante) communication of potential compensation schemes, but it also raises the
question of whether corresponding welfare effects that occur at the household level have
so far been properly understood.
Theoretically, the direct welfare effects of energy price changes at the household level
depend on themagnitude of the price change, the relative importance of energy items in a
household’s consumption bundle, and the ability andwillingness to substitute something
else for the more expensive good. In addition, price changes might affect production
costs and hence the prices of other goods, leading to indirect effects that will eventu-
ally affect labour demand and wages (Fullerton, 2008; Fullerton and Heutel, 2011). In
this paper, we analyse the welfare impacts of energy price changes using a partial equi-
librium approach based on a detailed empirical model of household energy demand in
Indonesia. Even though our model does not capture potential indirect effects, we prefer
it to a general equilibrium model for three reasons. First, the majority of energy subsi-
dies take the form of fixed prices for consumers, such that indirect effects through wages
and employment are unlikely to be of major importance in the short run. Second, the
use of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model would create a high demand for
empirically unavailable parameter values. Third, the disaggregated evaluation of differ-
ent energy items is a distinct strength of our analysis, and something which would not
be possible within a general equilibrium framework.
The empirical context of our study is Indonesia, a country with a long tradition of
regulating consumer energy prices and a recent change in subsidy policies, facilitated by
dramatically falling oil prices. Traditionally, the Indonesian government has set energy
prices for households below international market levels. The subsidy regime is intended
to increase energy-poor households’ access to energy and has been the dominant domes-
tic energy policy instrument for decades. In recent years, the high costs of the subsidies
have put considerable pressure on public finances – much more so since 2009 when
the country became a net oil importer and left the OPEC. Today, Indonesia is more oil
dependent than ever before. From 2000 to 2013, per capita final energy consumption
increased by over 55 per cent (MEMR, 2014), and fuel subsidies likely played a role in
this increase. As a reaction to the fiscal pressure, the government tried to implement sub-
sidy reductions in 2005, 2008, and 2013, when rising oil prices pushed up government
fuel subsidy expenditures. In late 2014, the newly elected government announced a com-
plete phaseout of fuel subsidies in the coming years. As part of all these recent subsidy
reforms, the government complemented fuel subsidy cuts with pro-poor compensation
programmes, which helped it gain public acceptance.1
This policy background makes the country an ideal case for studying the welfare
implications of energy price changes in a detailed fashion. We analyse a scenario of ris-
ing energy prices for a set of commercial energy items used by households and estimate
the impact on householdwelfare, energy poverty, and demand-related carbon emissions.
Our findings are relevant for the country’s policymakers as, with a resurging oil price,
the ongoing phasing out of fuel subsidies, and some domestic climate policy ambitions
as reflected by the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement,
energy prices are likely to rise for Indonesian households in the future.
Previous first-order partial equilibrium studies on the impact of energy pricing in
low- and middle-income countries have mainly concluded that fuel subsidy cuts or tax
1The compensation package for the 2013 reform, for instance, included short-term unconditional cash
transfers, increased food distribution, and additional spending on infrastructure programmes.
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increases tend to be progressive, primarily because poorer households tend to spend rel-
atively little on transport fuels.2 In earlier work on Indonesia, Pitt (1985) found that
kerosene subsidies disproportionally benefited urban and wealthy households. More
recently, Olivia andGibson (2008) have estimated a five-good household energy demand
system for Indonesia, finding that kerosene yields the highestmarginal tax returns.How-
ever, as soon as they incorporate inequality aversion into their optimisation problem,
kerosene is outperformed by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and gasoline. Datta (2010)
calculates own- and cross-price elasticities for demand for four energy items in India
and finds strong behavioural responses for transport fuel, kerosene, and LPG. Specifi-
cally, he finds relatively high substitution rates for LPG demand, and disproportionally
large responses of poor households to price changes in transport fuel and kerosene. Our
study also contributes to the literature that assesses energy price effects in Indonesia
using CGE models. The main conclusion to be drawn from this literature is that taxing
transport fuels tends to be progressive (Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008; Clements et al.,
2013), while kerosene taxation has regressive effects (Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008).
Another insight generated is that it is important to incorporate revenue spending into
the analysis, as it can substantially change the results (Dartanto, 2013; Durand-Lasserve
et al., 2015).
We argue that by incorporating additional outcomes into the impact analysis of
energy pricing reforms, we contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First,
based on a detailed household expenditure survey we estimate a household energy
demand system (QUAIDS) to distinguish between first- and second-orderwelfare effects
over the income distribution. Our analysis shows considerable heterogeneity of welfare
impacts. For gasoline and electricity, first-order calculations overestimate welfare effects
by 10 to 20 per cent for price changes between 20 and 50 per cent. This holds particularly
for gasoline and for richer households, which react more strongly to price changes. Sec-
ond, our results reveal that the ownership of energy-processing durables such as motor
transport vehicles, electric appliances, and cooking stoves is another source of impact
heterogeneity. Poor households that own these goods may be hit particularly heavily by
energy price increases. Third, we extend the welfare analysis beyond the money-metric
utility effects and look at energy poverty, which is understood as the absence of or imper-
fect access to reliable and clean modern energy services. By drawing on the estimated
demand function and the resulting price elasticities, we find that price increases have
substantial effects on energy poverty.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first present, in section 2, the
price and survey data as well as some descriptive statistics. In section 3, we describe the
theoretical and empirical models underpinning our welfare analysis. Section 4 presents
the results, and section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations.
2. Data
We use household expenditure data from the Indonesian Survei Sosial Ekonomi
Nasional (SUSENAS), a cross-section survey collected annually by Badan Pusat Statistik
2Sterner (2011) presents a collection of mostly first-order, partial-equilibrium studies on the impact of
transport fuel taxes on the poor inMexico, Costa Rica, China, India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania,
and on the impact of reducing transport fuel subsidies in Iran. Arze del Granado et al. (2012) provide a
review of fuel subsidies for 20 countries and find that the top income quintile receives as much as six times
more in subsidy payments than the bottom quintile.
Environment and Development Economics 183
Table 1. Gasoline demand, vehicle ownership and poverty
Pop% w (d ≥ 0)a w (d > 0)b Priv trc Motod
All 1 0.035 0.053 0.65 0.636
Urban 0.426 0.038 0.051 0.74 0.727
Rural 0.574 0.032 0.055 0.582 0.568
Poor 0.117 0.019 0.052 0.371 0.365
Nonpoor 0.883 0.037 0.053 0.686 0.672
Urban poor 0.039 0.025 0.053 0.462 0.459
Urban nonpoor 0.387 0.039 0.051 0.768 0.754
Rural poor 0.078 0.017 0.051 0.326 0.318
Rural nonpoor 0.497 0.035 0.056 0.623 0.607
aAverage budget share over population including zero demand.
bAverage budget share over population excluding zero demand.
cOwnership rate for private transport vehicle(s).
dOwnership rate for motorcycle(s).
(BPS) Indonesia.3 By drawing on the survey data and applying the national poverty lines
provided by BPS Indonesia, we find that the poverty rate in Indonesia was 12 per cent in
2013, with themajority of the poor living in rural areas (see also table 1).4 The SUSENAS
survey comes with a detailed expenditure module containing reported expenditures and
quantities for electricity (in kwh), gasoline (in litres), kerosene (in litres), and LPG (in
kg). We use resulting unit values and calculate village level median values, which are
used in the subsequent analysis.5 In addition, the module reports other expenditures for
transport, including spending on public transport, airfares, and marine transport.
In general, energy expenditures rise over the expenditure distribution, an increase
which appears to be driven by transport expenditures. Access tomodern domestic energy
sources is widespread, though some households below the 20th percentile are with-
out access. Even among this group, more than 90 per cent can access alternatives to
solely traditional energy. Figures 1 and 2 set out expenditure patterns for electricity,
gasoline, kerosene, and LPG for rural and urban households, respectively.6 Due to the
discrete nature of the decision to obtain major energy-consuming durables, we dis-
tinguish between the average user in the sample, including those with zero demand
(demand ≥0), and the average user with strictly positive demand (demand >0). This
is a simple approximation of the abovementioned heterogeneity in energy spending pat-
terns between households that, in contrast, may be similar in terms of household per
3Information is taken from the core and the consumption module. For descriptive purposes and the
welfare analysis we use theMarch 2013 data. For the estimation we use a pooled dataset consisting of annual
data for the years 2009–2013.
4The national poverty line is relatively low. In 2010, a year for which both international and national
poverty rates are reported by the World Bank, the poverty rate was 11.3 using the national poverty line and
15.9 using the int. $1.9 poverty line.
5Village level unit values are not used for electricity where a complex block-tariff system creates
household specific electricity prices.
6Nonparametric distributional curves are calculated with kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing
using an Epanechnikov kernel function with degree 0 and bandwidth 1.15.
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Figure 1. Rural energy expenditure shares and usage rates.
Figure 2. Urban energy expenditure shares and usage rates.
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capita income. In the case of the aggregated energy expenditures, this hardly makes a
difference, while it is very relevant to the analysis of single energy items. Electricity grid
access in Indonesia is high,with 76 per cent of households connected in 2012 (IEA, 2014).
In our survey data, electricity use also includes local power supply and diesel generators,
and we even observe that 90 per cent of households have non-zero electricity demand.
Electricity budget shares, on average, increase with income and are one percentage point
higher for urban than for rural households.
According to figures 1b and 2b, moving from the poorest to the richest households
doubles gasoline expenditure shares, for rural and urban households alike. Yet among
households that use gasoline, expenditure shares remain stable and, for this subgroup,
the first-order distributional effects of a gasoline tax would show a remarkably differ-
ent pattern. Thirty per cent of the poorest households use gasoline, mostly as an input
for motorcycle transport. Kerosene is now the least popular fuel in Indonesia, with only
30 per cent of households exhibiting positive demand. It is still more widely used in
rural areas and, somewhat surprisingly, not just by low-income households but also,
with slightly higher budget shares, by middle- and higher-income households. While
kerosene is a multipurpose fuel, LPG and firewood are mostly used for cooking. In rural
areas, LPG shows a very similar expenditure share pattern to kerosene, while usage rates
among urban households are substantially higher and expenditure shares are decreas-
ing in wealth. Low-income households depend heavily on firewood and, overall, rural
households use more firewood than urban households.
Typically, owning an energy-processing durable is a necessary condition for positive
energy demand. Private transport is a case in point for our empirical setting, where the
possession of private transport vehicles (specifically motorbikes) explains a large part
of gasoline demand. Once households own a motorbike, they tend to spend a similar
share of their income on gasoline, irrespective of their income levels. Table 1 illustrates
this relationship and depicts poverty status, ownership of a means of private transport,
and gasoline expenditure shares across several population subsamples. Out of all urban
and rural households, 65.0, 74.0, and 58.2 per cent possess some kind of private trans-
port vehicle, usually a motorbike. Poor households show a 40 per cent lower ownership
rate but only slightly lower gasoline expenditure shares than the non-poor. Urban-poor
vehicle owners spend an even higher budget share on gasoline than the urban non-poor
and, interestingly, we do not find major differences in transport-related energy demand
between rural and urban households. Our analysis of energy demand patterns reveals
interesting insights on an often-overlooked dimension of the distributional analysis of
energy price changes: energy poverty. The International Energy Association defines
energy poverty as ‘the lack of access tomodern energy services. These services are defined
as household access to electricity and clean cooking facilities [e.g., fuels and stoves that do
not cause air pollution in houses]’ (IEA, 2014).7 Hence, our focus is on the domestically
used energy items electricity, kerosene and LPG, for which expenditure information is
available in the household survey.We transform quantities of energy items into physical,
normalised units (kilograms of oil equivalent, kgoe) and aggregate them to household
energy use per capita.
Similarly to conventional poverty measurement, energy poverty measures depend
heavily on the underlying poverty line. Thus, in the following, we define two poverty
7A wider definition of energy poverty could also include transport-related energy or the quality and
performance of the energy use as discussed in Angelou et al. (2013), but this is beyond the scope of our
study.
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Table 2. Energy poverty
FGT
National Rural Urban
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
EPL 1 0.61 0.32 0.22 0.75 0.44 0.31 0.43 0.16 0.09
EPL 2 0.29 0.14 0.09 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.02
Note: EPL 2 poverty line: 21.82 kgoe.
lines. Our first energy poverty line (EPL 1) has a cut-off of 50 kgoe of final annual
energy per capita. This poverty line is solely based onmodern fuels (electricity, LPG and
kerosene) and used for cooking and electricity. This energy poverty line is similar to that
in Modi et al. (2005) but with no distinction in the energy services cooking and lighting.
We define our second energy poverty line (EPL 2) according to the expenditure poverty
line, inspired by Foster et al. (2000).We do this by transforming demanded quantities of
all modern energy items into kgoe and performing a nonparametric kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression of the quantity used per energy item on total household
expenditures per capita for the reference year 2013. The calculated value at the per capita
expenditure poverty line can then be directly interpreted as our energy poverty line,
at which we calculate the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) energy poverty indices. We
refrain from calculating a transport poverty line because of conceptual and empirical
issues, such as the difficulty of comparing urban and rural energy needs and the missing
public transport data. Table 2 displays the calculated FGT energy indices and the per
capita energy poverty line EPL 2, which is considerably lower than EPL 1 at approxi-
mately 22 kgoe. Although this poverty line is at a relatively low level, the national energy
poverty rate is close to 30 per cent, primarily as a result of the rural energy poverty rate
of 43 per cent. To be clear, there are many non-income-poor households which do not
use more modern energy than the average household at the poverty line. Based on EPL
1, the national energy poverty rate is above 60 per cent. Since many, and particularly
rural, households use firewood for cooking and we have excluded it from the analysis,
the magnitude is not particularly surprising.
3. Methodology
3.1 Demand system
There is an extensive literature on the estimation of demand functions based on eco-
nomic theory. Since the seminal work of Stone (1954), a significant amount of research
has been produced, with Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) Almost Ideal Demand Sys-
tem (AIDS) and the quadratic extension of the AIDS, the QUAIDS by Banks et al.
(1997) among the more prominent ones. The estimation of QUAIDS has been applied
to the energy context byWest andWilliams III (2004), Labandeira et al. (2006), Nikodi-
noska and Schröder (2016) and Tiezzi and Verde (2016). To our knowledge, no demand
system specification of this form has been applied to the energy context in low- and
middle-income countries before.
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Rank three quadratic logarithmic budget share systems have an indirect utility
function of the following form:
lnV =
{[
ln x − ln a(p)
b(p)
]−1
+ λ(p)
}−1
. (1)
The price indexes log[a(p)] and b(p) are defined as:
ln a(p) = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi ln pi + 12
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj (2)
b(p) =
n∏
i=1
pβii . (3)
The term λ(p) in the indirect utility function is a differentiable, homogeneous function
of degree zero of prices p and defined as:
λ(p) =
n∑
i=1
λi ln pi, (4)
with
∑
i λi = 0. The derived expenditure share system is:
wi = αi +
n∑
j=1
γij ln pj + βi ln
[
x
a(p)
]
+ λi
b(p)
{
ln
[
x
a(p)
]}2
, (5)
where wi is the share of commodity (group) i of total non-durable expenditures x. To be
consistent with utility maximization, the following restrictions need to hold:
Adding-up
n∑
i=1
αi = 1;
n∑
i=1
γij = 0;
n∑
i=1
βi = 0;
n∑
i=1
λi = 0 (6)
Homogeneity
n∑
j=1
γij = 0 (7)
Symmetry
γij = γji. (8)
In household expenditure data, recorded zero expenditures are a common problem. The
literature usually identifies this data issue as ‘censored’, although censoring may only
be a special case of the underlying data generating process. We stick to this discussion
and use ‘censored’ as a synonym for zero observations in budget share data. Shonkwiler
and Yen (1999) show a way to obtain unbiased elasticity estimates in censored system
settings. First, a household specific probit model is estimated with the outcome of 1 if the
household consumes good i and 0 otherwise. For each household, the standard normal
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probability density function (pdf) φ and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
are calculated by regressing wi on a set of independent variables zi, containing prices
for included goods, household total expenditures, sex and age of the household head, an
urban dummy and province fixed effects. Secondly, the pdf and the cdf are integrated
into the system of equations as follows:
w∗i = wi + ϕiφ. (9)
In contrast to Heckman (1979), this approach makes use of the full sample in both steps
of the estimation process. According to Shonkwiler and Yen (1999), the estimation of a
censored system requires a procedure that uses the whole sample since each dependent
variablemay have a different pattern of censoring. Budget elasticities can be derived from
the share equation (9):
e∗i =
(μi)
wi
+ 1, (10)
with
μi = ∂wi
∂ ln x
= βi + 2λib(p)
{
ln
[
x
a(p)
]}
. (11)
The uncompensated price elasticity is given by:
eu∗ij =
(μi)
wi
+ φτij
(
1 − ϕi
wi
)
− δij, (12)
with
μij = ∂wi
∂ ln pi
= γij − μi
(
αj +
n∑
k
γjk ln pk
)
− λiβj
b(p)
{
ln
[
x
a(p)
]}2
, (13)
and δij is the Kronecker delta. Compensated price elasticities are derived by the Slutsky
equation:
ec∗ij = eu∗ij + e∗i wj. (14)
This two-step methodology has been applied in food demand contexts by Yen et al.
(2002) and Ecker and Qaim (2011) amongst others but not yet for energy demand.
The demand system we use consists of four energy goods, electricity, gasoline,
kerosene and LPG, as well as a residual ‘other’ category. This category includes all
non-durable consumption goods other than the four energy goods.
3.2 Welfare effects
Since the literature on the welfare impacts of subsidy reforms focuses on first-order
effects as in Sterner (2011), we are interested in the necessity of calculating second-order
effects taking into account demand substitution. The first-order effects (FO) only require
the observed demand and no additional information on substitution behavior due to
price changes (Feldstein, 1972; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b; Stern, 1987):
FO =
n∑
i=1
wi
pi
p0i
. (15)
The difference between first-order welfare measures, approximated by the budget
share and more exact second-order approximations incorporating household demand
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responses, are well documented in Banks et al. (1996). As they demonstrate, the differ-
ence between first- and second-order or exact welfare measures can be quite substantial
when price changes are non-marginal. They point to another main difference which
is created by the distribution of substitution elasticities, which may change the wel-
fare effects considerably if elasticities differ over the income distribution. To account
for heterogeneous preferences, we obtain own- and cross-price elasticities (eij) on the
household level following Banks et al. (1997). These are then used in a cost of living
experiment with the second order welfare loss approximated by a second-order Taylor
series expansion of the cost function (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b):
CV =
n∑
i=1
wi
(
pi
p0i
)
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wieij
(
pi
p0i
)(
pj
p0j
)
. (16)
4. Results
We simulate the welfare and energy poverty impact for two stylised scenarios (20 and
50 per cent price increase) and obtain results for single and multiple simultaneous price
changes. Given the currently low international oil prices and past trends, scenarios with
even higher price increases of up to 100 per cent and above are indeed possible for the
coming years. Yet price changes of this magnitude would require us to forecast com-
pletely out of sample. As mentioned above, the survey data offers price information for
electricity, gasoline, kerosene, and LPG. Unfortunately, we do not have price informa-
tion for other transport or firewood expenditures and have to exclude them from further
analysis. In addition to these scenarios with energy price increases, we also simulate a
scenario that interprets the price change as an ad valorem tax rate and redistributes col-
lected tax revenues via lump-sum cash transfers to households. We assume similarity
between consumers’ responses to price changes due to market mechanisms and those
due to taxes, although there is increasing evidence that calls this assumption into ques-
tion (Rivers and Schaufele, 2015; Tiezzi and Verde, 2016). Since this difference is most
likely to play out in the long run, our analysis still offers valid results in the short run.
4.1 Estimation results
Due to the difficulty of the economic interpretation ofmodel coefficients, we report bud-
get elasticities in table 3 and price elasticities in table 4. Following Banks et al. (1997),
we calculate elasticities for each household individually and construct a weighted aver-
age, with the weights generated as the household’s share of total sample expenditure
for the relevant good. With rising income, the willingness to spend more on electricity
increases, transforming it from a necessity to a luxury good at the 90th percentile. We
observe high income responses towards gasoline use, with slightly rising budget elastici-
ties all above one and rising over the expenditure distribution. Gasoline is clearly a luxury
good for households of all incomes. Kerosene also exhibits budget elasticities close to 1,
particularly for lower-income households. LPG is also estimated to be a necessity for all
households, although as in the case of kerosene, the quantitative demand declines with
rising income.
Households with different incomes respond quite similarly to price changes for
all energy items, which is why we show only one price elasticity matrix for the first,
fifth, and tenth expenditure per capita decile. In general, households react strongly to
price changes for all energy items. Most own-price elasticities are close to −1, with the
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Table 3. Budget elasticities
Deciles Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG Other
1 0.877 1.341 0.933 0.824 0.984
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
2 0.890 1.391 0.905 0.810 0.984
(0.890) (1.391) (0.905) (0.810) (0.984)
3 0.905 1.407 0.895 0.804 0.984
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
4 0.916 1.435 0.893 0.784 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
5 0.935 1.448 0.890 0.771 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
6 0.950 1.446 0.886 0.754 0.985
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
7 0.966 1.437 0.880 0.737 0.985
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
8 0.986 1.435 0.870 0.721 0.986
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
9 1.014 1.429 0.856 0.701 0.986
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
10 1.083 1.361 0.780 0.623 0.988
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
strongest response observed for gasoline. Based on the estimations, we expect to find
differences between first- and second-order welfare effects, particularly for electricity
and gasoline price changes, when high usage rates overlap with relatively large own-
price elasticities. The evaluation of cross-price elasticities reveals that not all modern
domestic energy items are complements. Electricity and kerosene are weak substitutes,
while electricity and LPG are weak complements, more so for households with higher
income. The cross-price elasticities between LPG and kerosene are zero, which clearly
shows the unimportant role of energy prices for the politically supported conversion
from kerosene to LPG. Substitution between private transport in the form of gasoline
demand and domestic energy has no general pattern either. Kerosene and LPG are weak
substitutes and complements, respectively, for gasoline, while gasoline and electricity-
gasoline cross-price elasticities are close to zero. For other countries, the substitutability
of energy items appears to be very context specific, as the findings in the empirical litera-
ture demonstrate. Tiezzi andVerde (2016) find complementarity between electricity and
gasoline for the United States, while Nikodinoska and Schröder (2016) find the opposite
for Germany. Since this is a critical step in the further analysis, we test for the potential
bias of different prices through the geographical location of the household by including
province-fixed effects and find no significant difference.8
8Households in remote locations face higher prices for all modern energy items and also exhibit lower
demand.
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Table 4. Price elasticities
Price
Decile Item Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG Other
1 Electricity −0.83 0.03 0.01 −0.05 0.85
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.03 −1.01 0.02 −0.03 0.96
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Kerosene 0.03 0.05 −0.95 0.00 0.78
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG −0.10 −0.08 0.00 −0.99 1.20
(0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008)
Other 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
5 Electricity −0.82 0.04 0.01 −0.09 0.83
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.03 −1.03 0.03 −0.08 0.97
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Kerosene 0.04 0.14 −0.95 0.00 0.77
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG −0.16 −0.20 0.00 −1.01 1.33
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
Other 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 −0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10 Electricity −0.80 0.01 0.01 −0.13 0.83
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Gasoline 0.01 −0.97 0.04 −0.17 0.96
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Kerosene 0.04 0.21 −0.94 0.00 0.76
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004)
LPG −0.45 −0.75 0.00 −1.05 2.09
(0.005) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013)
Other 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.02 −0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
4.2 Welfare and poverty effects
A relatively moderate 20 per cent price increase for all four energy items under con-
sideration and averaging over all households per expenditure percentile is displayed in
figure 3. As expected, electricity and gasoline make up the biggest part of the welfare
losses, with a progressive pattern in both cases. The relative welfare losses for a uniform
20 per cent electricity price increase are between 0.4 and 0.6 per cent of total expenditures
for the poorest and richest households, respectively. For gasoline, these relative welfare
losses are larger, particularly for richer households, lying between 0.4 and 0.7 per cent.
Smaller welfare effects for kerosene and LPG reflect their relatively low usage rates and
budget shares. For the domestically used LPG, a price increase would be slightly regres-
sive, but the magnitude is small due to the low usage rates. This could change, however,
if more and more households begin using LPG instead of firewood – in rural areas as
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Figure 3. Welfare effects Scenario I.
well. The difference between the upper-bound first-order effects and the lower-bound
second-order effects is relatively small at this magnitude of price effects. First-order esti-
mates of welfare losses in the first scenario are 10 per cent higher on average. These
welfare losses become more pronounced in the second scenario of a 50 per cent price
increase, where the difference increases to over 20 per cent for electricity and gaso-
line, again with small observed differences for kerosene and LPG (figure 4). Particularly
for gasoline, the second-order effects are slightly less progressive. What is responsi-
ble for this effect is not a variation in demand responses with rising expenditures, but
rather the increase in the usage rate. A larger fraction of households with actual gasoline
demand also implies a larger substitution potential. Low-income households which are
close to the poverty line and dependent on the use of modern energy are not as strongly
represented in these average effects.
The poverty indicators in table 5 do not show a large increase, but absolute numbers
are important to consider.9 The moderate electricity price increases in Scenario I raise
the national poverty rate by 0.23 per cent, which appears to be a very small increase but
means in absolute terms that approximately an additional half a million people, most of
them in rural areas, will be classified as poor. For gasoline price increases, we observe
a similar magnitude. Although the poverty effects are relatively small due to the low
usage rates and budget shares for modern energy, a significant and growing number
of households are negatively affected by price increases. Most of these households are
located in urban areas, but with more rural households using modern energy items and
private transport vehicles, this finding is unlikely to be stable over time. Non-negligible
9Second-order welfare effects are used in the computation of post-reform poverty indices.
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Figure 4. Welfare effects Scenario II.
effects can also be found for LPG price increases, which demonstrates LPG’s importance
as the new major cooking fuel for Indonesian households.
In themultiple price change scenario, changing prices for all four energy items simul-
taneously, we observe a general progressive pattern, dominated by electricity and, in
particular, gasoline (figure 5). Nevertheless, multiple price changes for the energy items
under consideration would result in serious welfare losses for poor households of close
to 1.5 and 3 per cent of total expenditures in the case of Scenario I and Scenario II,
respectively. Particularly in the case of Scenario II, higher usage rates and associated
substitution options for higher income households make the distributional effect less
progressive. On the other hand, this lower progressivity also means there is less need to
redistribute tax revenue to higher income households, since they are capable of dealing
with price increases. The poverty effects are quite strong, with increases of 0.6 and 1.2
percentage points in the poverty rate for Scenario I and Scenario II, respectively.
To shed some light on the potential effects of redistribution if energy taxes of
20 per cent are the drivers behind the price increases, we simulate a full redistribution of
tax revenues via lump-sum transfers to households. For all four energy items, the redis-
tribution of tax revenue leads to welfare gains for low-income households (figure 6).
Electricity and gasoline taxes raise substantial revenue, which could lead to quite large
welfare gains for the majority of the population if proper redistribution schemes can be
identified. Welfare gains are also reflected in the poverty indicators, which improve for
all scenarios (table 5). Asmuch as urban households are disproportionately hit by energy
price hikes, there are alsomore urban households which benefit from transfer payments.
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Table 5. FGT poverty indices (in %), changes from baseline
National Rural Urban
FGT (in %) – difference to baseline
Price
Transfer increase Scenario 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
No Electricity I 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00
II 0.51 0.10 0.03 0.43 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.00
Gasoline I 0.21 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00
II 0.47 0.07 0.02 0.39 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00
Kerosene I 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
II 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
LPG I 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
II 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Energy I 0.59 0.11 0.03 0.49 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.00
II 1.21 0.24 0.07 1.11 0.23 0.07 0.24 0.07 0.00
Lump- Electricity I −0.31 −0.08 −0.02 −0.05 −0.02 −0.44 −0.03 0.00 0.00
sum II −0.60 −0.15 −0.05 −0.09 −0.03 −0.87 −0.06 0.00 0.00
Gasoline I −0.49 −0.12 −0.04 −0.08 −0.03 −0.67 −0.05 0.00 0.00
II −0.90 −0.22 −0.07 −0.15 −0.05 −1.25 −0.09 0.00 0.00
Kerosene I −0.05 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
II −0.06 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
LPG I −0.09 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.17 −0.01 0.00 0.00
II −0.20 −0.05 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.37 −0.03 0.00 0.00
Energy I −0.89 −0.21 −0.06 −0.13 −0.04 −1.28 −0.09 0.00 0.00
II −1.51 −0.35 −0.11 −0.22 −0.07 −2.22 −0.14 0.00 0.00
Figure 5. Welfare effects simultaneous increase Scenarios I & II.
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Figure 6. Welfare effects with lump-sum transfers Scenario I.
Since universal lump-sum transfers are unlikely to be implemented, more realistic redis-
tribution schemes would rely on social welfare programmes, which directly target the
poor.10
4.3 Energy poverty
Based on the estimated price elasticity matrices, we calculate the quantities households
reduce per capita in response to price increases for the respective scenarios. Based on
these behavioural responses, we calculate the FGT class of indices for both scenarios
and energy poverty lines and find significant effects on energy poverty resulting from
lower energy use. Table 6 displays the change in FGT indicators for the two simulated
scenarios. We find that price increases have considerable effects on the poverty rate,
with particularly tremendous effects in the case of electricity and LPG price increases.
LPG price increases result in higher energy poverty levels than kerosene price increases,
with the latter demonstrating the smallest effects, as expected. For all modern fuels,
the increase in energy poverty is greater in rural areas, despite the higher urban usage
rates. As discussed in the interpretation of estimated price elasticities, complementar-
ity between LPG and gasoline implies reduced domestic energy use, also in the case
of gasoline price increases. Energy poverty increases due to gasoline price changes are
approximately 25 per cent of those resulting from LPG price increases, a value close to
10The survey data does offer information on social welfare programmes, but unfortunately their coverage
is limited and therefore unsuitable for a large-scale redistribution scheme.
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Table 6. FGT energy poverty indices (in %), changes from baseline
National Rural Urban
FGT (in %) – difference to baseline
Price En. pov.
Scenario increase line 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
1 Electricity 1 4.27 2.87 2.09 3.07 2.86 2.37 5.87 2.89 1.72
2 2.84 1.49 0.95 3.33 1.99 1.32 2.19 0.84 0.47
Gasoline 1 1.03 0.40 0.13 0.41 0.08 −0.10 1.85 0.83 0.43
2 0.20 −0.10 −0.14 −0.07 −0.26 −0.27 0.55 0.11 0.03
Kerosene 1 0.88 0.69 0.58 0.97 0.97 0.89 0.76 0.32 0.17
2 0.74 0.51 0.37 1.19 0.85 0.63 0.13 0.06 0.02
LPG 1 3.77 2.37 1.61 2.70 2.22 1.71 5.18 2.57 1.48
2 2.11 0.99 0.62 2.32 1.26 0.85 1.84 0.62 0.32
2 Electricity 1 9.41 6.58 4.89 6.44 6.32 5.38 13.35 6.93 4.25
2 6.83 3.59 2.34 7.58 4.65 3.19 5.85 2.19 1.22
Gasoline 1 2.41 1.03 0.42 0.88 0.24 −0.12 4.44 2.07 1.13
2 0.68 −0.12 −0.24 0.04 −0.48 −0.52 1.54 0.37 0.14
Kerosene 1 1.89 1.48 1.26 1.97 2.04 1.92 1.77 0.73 0.39
2 1.62 1.13 0.85 2.51 1.88 1.44 0.45 0.14 0.06
LPG 1 7.84 5.42 3.85 5.59 5.00 4.01 10.81 5.98 3.63
2 5.36 2.49 1.58 5.61 3.10 2.11 5.03 1.67 0.88
the estimated cross-price elasticity. The redistribution of tax revenues does not signifi-
cantly change energy poverty since households are projected to spend most of the extra
income on goods other than energy.11
These findings reflect the downside of consumer responses and the associated smaller
welfare effects through substitution. While the microeconomic welfare metric tells us
only about utility-based monetary effects, other welfare dimensions such as energy
poverty are not directly addressed in a standard welfare assessment. Although one could
argue that households take energy requirements into account in consumption decisions,
they are also likely to substitute traditional fuels formodern fuels when prices rise. Addi-
tionally, theymay not internalise all associated external costs such as health issues caused
by air pollution. Unfortunately, our data does not permit us to quantify the exact nature
of substitution between modern and traditional fuels when prices change. However, a
simple estimation of firewood demand in aWorking-Leser form (Working, 1943; Leser,
1963) depending on prices for modern energy sources, household total expenditures x,
and household characteristics H sheds some light on this issue:
wfwd = αfwd +
n∑
j=1
γij ln pj + ln(x) + H. (17)
Due to a significant share of zero firewood budget shares, equation (17) is estimated
as a Heckman selection model with additional variables reflecting lighting and cooking
11Results are almost identical to the scenario without redistribution and therefore not reported.
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Table 7. Firewood cross-price elasticities
Prices
Electricity Gasoline Kerosene LPG
Firewood 0.11 −2.29 0.41 0.28
fuel choice in the identifying equation.12 The estimated firewood cross-price elastici-
ties (table 7) exhibit an expected substitutability between the other domestically used
energy items – electricity, kerosene, and LPG – and firewood. This provides some evi-
dence, though it is not integrated into the rest of the analysis due to data constraints,
that households are very likely to increase the use of traditional fuels when prices of
modern, domestically used energy items rise. Households may not reduce domestically
used energy as strongly as energy poverty indices suggest, but instead move towards
traditional fuels.
Such behaviour is in line with the literature on the energy ladder that provides
evidence on the effects of modern energy prices on traditional fuel use (Leach, 1992;
Heltberg, 2005; Gebreegziabher et al., 2012). Unlike the discrete choicemodels in this lit-
erature, the estimatedWorking-Lesermodel represents a structural approach that allows
for insights on how much the quantity of traditional fuels used changes in response to a
price change of modern fuels.
5. Conclusion
Consumer energy price increases affect richer households more in relative terms, and
therefore also in absolute terms. On the one hand, our findings confirm prior studies,
which are based on observed demand and the assumption of zero substitution between
goods, on the progressive direction of this effect for electricity and gasoline. On the other
hand, we find neutral effects for kerosene and LPG and smaller welfare losses for electric-
ity and gasoline by employing second-order welfare estimates. The calculated first-order
effects for electricity and gasoline are on average 10 and 20 per cent larger in Scenario
I and Scenario II, which may seem small in relative terms but represent substantial dif-
ferences in absolute terms. First-order effects particularly overestimate welfare losses
for the upper part of the income distribution, where small percentage changes in relative
terms translate into large absolute monetary amounts. This has important consequences
for redistribution, since richer households are estimated to be capable of dealing with
increasing energy prices and therefore less in need of compensation. This holds partic-
ularly for gasoline, which is at the centre of the subsidy debate and a major fuel used by
households. Due to low-income households’ lower usage rates, the poverty impacts are
also moderate when prices change by small amounts.
Despite these supposedly small relative changes, a non-marginal number of low-
income households are highly affected by energy price changes. Additionally, a substan-
tial and growing number of households are vulnerable to large energy price increases,
which may be quite likely when energy subsidies are completely abolished. Ultimately,
the redistribution of taxes or saved subsidies is crucial to turning this story around to
create welfare gains and poverty reduction. Although the simulated lump-sum transfers
12As in the case of demand system coefficients, we do not report results due to the difficulty of the
economic interpretation. We report elasticities instead.
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are quite effective in absorbing large welfare shocks, more targeted transfers are cer-
tainly desirable from an equity and fiscal perspective. The estimation of a demand system
proves to be useful for calculatingwelfare effects, and the consideration of energy poverty
and household-related carbon emissions makes it even more valuable. Without changes
in the quantities demanded being taking into account, the degree of energy poverty
would not change in our expenditure based definition of energy poverty. In addition
to welfare losses from energy price increases, households also suffer from a lack of mod-
ern energy items, which could trigger additional negative impacts such as adverse health
effects through the shift to traditional sources of energy. By simulating energy itemquan-
tities, we find that price increases for energy used domestically have substantial effects
on energy poverty. Somewhat surprisingly, this also holds for gasoline, since the estima-
tion reveals a complementary relationship to LPG. This complementarity is particularly
problematic for low-income households, for which these energy goods have much more
of a necessity character than they do in high-income households. The resulting diver-
gence of relatively small estimated second-order welfare effects and large impacts on
energy poverty reflects a weakness of standard welfare metrics, which assumes complete
information and the absence of negative externalities.
Additionally, the redistribution of tax revenue is only partially able to deal with rising
energy poverty in our model since households spend most of the transfer income on
goods other thanmodern energy. The resulting increased use of traditional biomass fuels
such as firewood is certainly critical from both a health perspective, due to indoor air
pollution, and a CO2 emissions perspective, due to deforestation.13
For all simulated effects, we have to keep in mind that households can only reduce
energy use to a certain minimum level. This and the nature of our modeling framework
restricts the interpretation of results to the very short-run perspective.
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